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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
awakening to the importance of one of its traditional functions. From the
promulgation of the new rules of court, the conclusion is irresistible that
the court considers the statutory grounds of disbarment"i directory rather
than mandatory, and that it is assuming complete control over the conduct
of attorneys. And since this is an inherent judicial function, 12 the court
is clearly exercising a power reserved to it by the Constitution of Mis-
souri.14  J. L. F.
AUTOMOBmLEs-ADERTSING-WRRANTY-[Federal]. -The acute ques-
tion whether the sub-purchaser of a chattel may maintain an action against
the manufacturer for breach of warranty, upon the theory that the manufac-
turer's advertising constituted a representational warranty to the sub-pur-
chaser, has again come up for decision in the recent case of Chanin V. Chev-
rolet Motor Company.1
The plaintiff, who had purchased an automobile from a dealer, joined the
manufacturer as co-defendant in a suit to recover damages for injuries
caused by the breaking of a windshield which the manufacturer had adver-
tised as being shatterproof. The court adhered to the orthodox rule and held
that suit for damages for breach of warranty cannot be maintained where
there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant, and that
the advertisements did not constitute such a contract as to bind the manu-
facturer.
It should be noted that this action was not based upon fraud or deceit,
although a manufacturer's untrue advertisement, made with knowledge of
its untruth, might be the basis for such an action.2 Nor was the action one
in tort, based upon the conception that the windshield was intrinsically
dangerous to human life, so as to come within the rule of Mac Pherson v.
Buick Motor Company,3 but was an action strictly on warranty.
There are, generally speaking, three classes of warranties. The first is
the promissory warranty which is purely contractual;4 the second is the
warranty based upon representations, regardless of whether or not the per-
son making the representations intended to be bound thereby; 5 the third is
the warranty imposed by law, commonly termed "implied warranty."6 It
11. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 11707.
12. Supra, note 9.
13. Mo. Const. Art 3 (1875).
1. 15 F. Supp. 57 (D. C. N. C. Ill., 1935) ; now pending appeal.
2. Marsh v. Usk Hardware Co., 73 Wash. 543, 132 Pac. 241 (1913); see
Alpine v. Friend Bros., 138 N. E. 553 (Mass. 1923).
3. 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 440 L. R. A. 1916 F;
for a recent case based upon this doctrine see Bird v. Ford Motor Company,
15 F. Supp. 590 (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1936).
4. Holcombe and Hoke Mfg. Co. v. Osterberg, 181 Minn. 547, 233 N. W.
302 (1930) ; Palawink v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 57 N. D. 199, 220 N. W.
638 (1928).
5. Uniform Sales Act, sec. 12; 1 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) sec. 197,
200, 201.
6. Uniform Sales Act, sec. 12-16, for implied warranties of title, quality,
etc.; see also Foote v. Wilson, 104 Kans. 191, 178 Pac. 430 (1919).
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is on the second type of warranty that the plaintiff sought to recover in
the instant case.
The rule requiring privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant
in a suit to recover damages for breach of warranty has been criticized as
based in its origin upon a misconception of the history of warranty.7 Pro-
fessor Williston has popularized the historical fact that warranty originally
was actionable in tort but later, with the development of assumpsit, came to
be associated with contract principles.8 He has referred to a warranty ac-
tion as "a hybrid between a tort and contract."D Nevertheless the require-
ment of privity of warranty generally has been rigidly adhered to.10
However, some courts have tended to break away from this strict require-
ment and have, contrived theories to avoid its application. Thus, in Ward
Baking Company v. Trizzanon the court considered the warranty betveen
the dealer and the manufacturer to be for the benefit of the consumer and
hence, as in a third party beneficiary contract, allowed the consumer to sue
on the warranty. A recent Missouri case, Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-
Cola Bottling Company' 2 seems to have adopted the theory that the sub-
purchaser was the assignee of the dealer and therefore was the assignee of
the benefit of the warranty. Again, some courts have held that the warranty
runs with the title to the chattel in the same manner that covenants of
warranty run with land.' 3 It should be noted, however, that these are all
food cases, in which the courts have been influenced by the public interest
in the supply of safe and palatable food.
The first case allowing a suit on a warranty theory by a sub-purchaser
of another kind of chattel was Baxter v. Ford Motor Company,14 upon which
the plaintiff in the Chanin case relied almost exclusively. In that case, upon
an identical state of facts, the Washington court allowed recovery against
the manufacturer, although there was no privity of contract between the
manufacturer and the sub-purchaser. This decision, hailed as an innovation
7. 1 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) sec. 244 a; for a severe criticism of
the orthodox view requiring privity of contract in a suit on warranty; see
42 Harv. L. Rev. 414 (1932).
8. Ames, The History of Assumpsit (1888) 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1 at 8; 1 Wil-
liston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) sec. 195.
9. Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1910) 24 Harv. L.
Rev. 415.
10. Standard Oil Company v. Murray, 119 Fed. 575, 25 L. Ed. 621, (C. C.
A. 7, 1902); Switzer v. Henking, 158 Fed. 784, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151
(C. C. A. 6, 1908) ; Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Company, 248 N. Y.
73, 161 N. E. 423 (1928) ; for a reductio ad absurdum of the privity of con-
tract theory in warranty see Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N. E.
785, L. R. A. 1919 E, 1006.
11. 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (1928) ; see comment on this case,
2 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 330 (1928).
12. 90 S. W. (2) 445 (1936).
13. Mazzeti v. Armour, 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913); Dothan
Chero-Cola Bottling Company v. Weeks, 16 Ala. App. 639, 80 So. 734
(1918); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Mass. 876, 111 So. 305
(1927).
14. 12 Pac. (2) 409, 68 Wash. Dec. 384; Affirmed on rehearing, 70 Wash.
Dec. 2 (1932).
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in the law of warranty,1 was a recognition of modern business practices
whereby manufacturers through the media of large scale distribution and
national advertising are substantially dealing directly with the ultimate
consumer.' 6 The court was impressed by the injustice of the orthodox rule
which would permit manufacturers to create a demand for their goods
through advertising representations, and then deny the consumer the right
to recover merely because there was no privity of contract existing between
the consumer and the manufacturer. 1'7
It appears that the return to the orthodox view is not in keeping with the
more enlightened authorities who point out that there is no essential dif-
ference between a representation made to an immediate buyer and one made
to the public through the media of advertising.' s Neither is it in keeping
with the need for a progressive law to meet changing social conditions.
0. R. A.
BANKS AND BANKING--DEPOSITS-BANK COLLECTION CODE-[MISSOURI].
-One Davidson, the payee, received a check drawn on the Commerce Trust
Company by the defendant, in exchange for grain receipts which turned
out to be spurious. Davidson endorsed the check without restriction, and
deposited it to his credit in plaintiff bank, and was permitted to draw
against the check. Plaintiff bank forwarded the check to the Commerce
Trust Company for collection, but defendant had stopped payment because
of Davidson's alleged fraud. Plaintiff bank sued defendant as drawer of the
check for $18,296. Held: plaintiff was the owner of the check and not an
agent for collection, notwithstanding that the deposit slip was on a form
stating that the bank took check as agent for collection.1
At common law there were three general types of deposits of a check or
draft. If a customer presented a check or draft, endorced without restric-
tion, for deposit, the bank became the owner of the check or draft and the
relationship of debtor and creditor was created. 2. If the depositor restric-
tively endorsed his check or draft, such as, "for collection and remittance,"
15. Note, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 94-5 (1932); 46 Harv. L. Rev. 161-2 (1932);
7 Wash. L. Rev. 351-9 (1932); 18 Cornell L. Q. 445-52 (1933).
16. For a study of the modern business practice of manufacturers in
making representations to ultimate consumers, see Bogert and Fink, Busi-
ness Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods (1930) 25 Ill. L.
Rev. 400.
17. Supra, note 14.
18. 1 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) sec. 244a; Vold, Sales (1931) sec.
152, 153; see also Uniform Sales Act, sec. 12.
1. Liberty Nat. Bank v. Vanderslice Lynds Co., 95 S. W. (2d) 324 (Mo.
1936).
2. Ayres v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 79 Mo. 421 (1883); McKeen
v. Boatmen's Bank, 74 Mo. App. 281 (1898); in re Purl's Estate, 147 Mo.
App. 105, 125 S. W. 849 (1910); Padgett v. Bank of Mountain View, 141
Mo. App. 374, 125 S. W. 219 (1910); Ellington v. Cantley, 300 S. W. 529a
(Mo. 1929); in re North Missouri Trust Company, 39 S. W. (2d) 412 (Mo.
1931).
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